: The authors suggest that majoritarian democratic politics may "overproduce" sanctions as a policy tool due to domestic demands from various interest groups within their own large winning coalitions. Summary of Hypotheses Institutional Effect Sanction Success
The authors utilize the Selectorate Theory to explain why sanctions often fail against autocracies but are more effective against democracies:
: In democracies, leaders rely on a large coalition. Economic pain felt by the broader public directly threatens the leader's support base, making them more likely to concede. 2007. An Institutional Theory of Sanctions Onse...
: Senders are more likely to initiate sanctions against states where they believe the political institutions will make the sanctions effective.
Beyond success rates, the paper explores why certain states are targeted in the first place: : The authors suggest that majoritarian democratic politics
More likely against democratic targets; less likely against autocracies.
Autocratic leaders benefit from the scarcity created by sanctions to reward loyalists. : Senders are more likely to initiate sanctions
Institutional theories of sanctions combine elements of the punishment and expressive approaches. Like the punishment perspective, Florida State University An Institutional Theory of Sanctions Onset and Success